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I. INTRODUCTION
By all accounts, the Model Penal Code is enormously respected and influential.'
Yet, relatively soon after the Code's 1962 publication, the Code's sexual offense
provisions and even its 1980 revised Commentaries 2 were already considered
outdated. The rapid onslaught of the sexual and feminist revolutions of the 1960s and
1970s3 brought an intense momentum to change rape laws that the Code had, in part,
either mirrored or inspired.4 Only because of the passage of time, the Code's sexual
offense provisions and Commentaries now misrepresent the progressive thinking of
the Code's reporters. For these reasons, I think the Model Penal Code's sexual
offense provisions should be pulled, revised, and replaced.
With such a recommendation in mind, this essay has two goals: it explains why a
number of the Code's sexual offense provisions were so advanced when they were
created, but also why their continuing, unaltered existence makes their original virtues
too easy to forget. What started as a leading authority for the legal enhancement of
women and homosexuals is now a relic that detracts from the credit and foresight that
its creators deserve. 5 Periodically, the Code's Commentaries acknowledged that the
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I thank Lawrence Fleischer, Christopher
Hale, and Marc Spindleman for helpful comments and Janice Greer and Marianna Politzer for excellent
research assistance.
I Gerard E. Lynch, Revising the Model Penal Code: Keeping It Real, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 219,
220 (2003).
2 MODEL PENAL CODE art. 213, introductory n. (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980)
[hereinafter MODEL PENAL CODE 1980]. There are seven sexual offense provisions in Article 213 of the
Model Penal Code: § 213.0 Definitions; § 213.1 Rape and related offenses; § 213.2 Deviate sexual
intercourse by force or imposition; § 213.3 Corruption of minors and seduction; § 213.4 Sexual assault;
§ 213.5 Indecent exposure; and § 213.6 Provisions generally applicable to 213. Id. Rape, deviate sexual
intercourse, and some sections of corruption of minors are felony offenses; the remaining offenses are
misdemeanors. MODEL PENAL CODE 1980, supra, art. 213, introductory n. at 271-73. This essay
primarily focuses on rape and related offenses. See MODEL PENAL CODE 1980, supra, § 213.1 at 274.
3 See generally DAVID ALLYN, MAKE LOVE, NOT WAR: THE SEXUAL REVOLUTION, AN
UNFETTERED HISTORY (2000) (providing a detailed analysis of the sexual revolution in the United States
during the 1960s and 1970s).
4 See Leigh Bienen, Rape III-National Developments in Rape Reform Legislation, 6 WOMEN'S
RTs. L. REP. 171, 175-76 (1980).
5 Others in this issue have keenly observed ways that the Code can be improved. See Lynch, supra
note 1, at 227-39; Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can A Model Penal Code Second Save the
States From Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 169, 173-77 (2003); Kenneth W. Simons, Should the
207
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW
sexual offense provisions would at some point need redrafting to keep pace with the
times. For these reasons, a primary source of support for my pull-and-replace
recommendations are the contents of the Commentaries themselves.
II. THE CODE'S COMMENTARIES: A RICH, INTERPRETATIVE GUIDE
The Code's sexual offense provisions and their Commentaries may be dated, but
they have not been displaced. Modem courts still regularly cite to them,6 and so do
leading criminal law casebooks.7 The provisions also remain the American Law
Institute's official word on the topic of sex offenses.8
The Commentaries in particular provide key guidance to jurists and others about
how to interpret the Code's provisions. Richly detailed, the Commentaries also offer
a superb analysis of the social norms of their era as well as a history and rationale for
the Code reporters' decisions. One of the more intriguing revelations from the
American Law Institute's extensive documentation of meetings and correspondence
beyond even the Commentaries, for example, is the extent to which the Institute relied
on the results of Alfred Kinsey's sexuality research for help with conceptualizing the
provisions. 9 Indeed, the Commentaries indicate that many of the factors that framed
the Code's sexual offense provisions are still reflected in modem rape statutes. By
understanding how rape laws were influenced in the past, we have a better idea of
how they can be reshaped in the future.
In sum, the Code's sexual offense provisions and Commentaries are juridical,
historical, and important. Let them also be up to date. To make a convincing case for
revision, however, it's worthwhile examining more closely what the Commentaries
say.
Model Penal Code's Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 182-200 (2003).
Two contributors have emphasized in particular the problematic nature of the sexual offenses provision.
Lynch, supra note 1, at 230-31; Robinson & Cahill, supra, at 169.
6 See MODEL PENAL CODE 1980, supra note 2, §§ 213.0-.6; 1OAU.L.A. 432-80 (2003). As one
would expect, some of the case references to the Model Penal Code are negative or critical. Yet, the fact
that the Code is mentioned at all is indication that a court senses a need to address its authority.
7 See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIAL ON CRIMINAL LAW 407-08 (3d ed. 2003)
(citing the provision and Commentaries pertaining to MODEL PENAL CODE 1980 § 213.1, and providing
the sexual offense provisions in the Appendix); SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 369-70 (7th ed. 2001) (citing the provision
and Commentaries pertaining to MODEL PENAL CODE 1980 § 213.1, and providing the sexual offense
provisions in the Appendix).
8 1 agree with Paul Robinson and Michael Cahill that the Institute is the most suitable body to make
the changes in the Model Penal Code, and its imprimatur is important. Robinson & Cahill, supra note 5,
at 175-76.
David Allyn, Private Acts/Public Policy: Alfred Kinsey, the American Law Institute and the
Privatization of American Sexual Morality, 30 J. AM. STUD. 405, 407-28 (1996) (detailing Alfred
Kinsey's influence on the Model Penal Code reporters responsible for the sexual offenses provisions); see
also infra notes 43-44 (citing Kinsey's major books on sexuality).
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III. THE CODE'S RAPE AND RELATED OFFENSES PROVISION
Most of the controversy over the Code's sexual offense provisions concerns the
section on rape and related offenses,' 0 which specifies three felony levels of sexual
intercourse with a mentally competent and aware, adult woman. Rape is a felony of
the second degree when a male "has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife...
if... he compels her to submit by force or by threat of imminent death, serious bodily
injury, extreme pain or kidnapping, to be inflicted on anyone."'1 Rape is a felony of
the first degree when a male has fulfilled these conditions and either "inflicts serious
bodily injury upon anyone" or evidence shows "the victim was not [his] voluntary
social companion ... upon the occasion of the crime and had not previously permitted
him sexual liberties."' 2 Sexual intercourse becomes the third degree felony of "gross
sexual imposition" when a male "compels" a female not his wife "to submit by any
threat that would prevent resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution."' 3
The Code's sexual offense provisions were to be a "model" for existing laws and
therefore represent then current attitudes. Regardless, the rape provisions were still
impressively forward thinking. For example, some offense elements had new terms
and "the grading differentials by and large ha[d] no counterpart in prior law."'' 4
A. "Objective Manifestations ofAggression by the Actor"
A primary motivating force behind the Code's approach was an emphasis upon
"objective manifestations of aggression by the actor,"'15 an effort to focus on the
defendant's actions rather than the victim's. Yet, another major concern was to
protect the defendant against unfair prosecution. At the time the Code's provisions
were first published, rape was still a capital offense;' 6 the punitive stakes were high,
particularly for black men accused of raping white women.' 7
Irrespective of the Code's precise reasons for its approach, the Commentaries
make clear that prosecutions were not tenable without objective evidence of the
defendant's use of force. For example, an injury criterion for first-degree rape was
considered "plainly relevant to the dangerousness of the actor and an objectively
determinable event that reinforces a conclusion of aggression by the actor and
10 MODEL PENAL CODE 1980, supra note 2, § 213.1 at 274-75.
ii' Id. § 213. 1(1)(a) at 274.
12 Id. §213.1(1) at 274.
13 Id. § 213.1(2)(a) at275.
14 Id. § 213.1 cmt. 2at 279.
15 Id. at 280.
16 In Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), the United States Supreme Court held that the death
penalty for the rape of an adult woman was "grossly disproportionate and excessive" and therefore
prohibited as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 592.
17 MODEL PENAL CODE 1980, supra note 2, § 213.1 cmt. 3 at 281-82.
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nonconsent by the victim.' 8 In contrast, the voluntary social companion criterion
"reduces confidence in the conclusion of aggression and nonconsent, and seems
relevant as well to the degree of injury inflicted and the general dangerousness of the
actor."19
Efforts to require this kind of "objective" verification and degree of injury have
backfired in light of today's attitudes towards sexual force. Also, the great majority of
rapes do not involve serious bodily injury beyond penetration even though most
victims believe that they will be hurt or even killed.
B. "Voluntary Social Companion"
One of the more controversial facets of the Code's rape provisions is the lesser
felony degree that applies when the victim was the defendant's "voluntary social
companion" and had "previously permitted him sexual liberties"-ill-defined and
antiquated terms that are now interpreted as a euphemism for date rape. This issue
has hardly been relegated to history. In 1997, for example, United States Senator
Joseph Biden lobbied Delaware legislators to eliminate the "voluntary social
companion" element of his state's rape statute that treated accused rapists
substantially less harshly if a victim had accompanied them willingly at the time of
the alleged assault (unless the attacker used a gun or inflicted serious injury beyond
the intercourse). 20 Biden considered Delaware's provision "barbaric" and "obscene,"
because "rape is rape, no matter what the relationship.'
The Delaware law, now since repealed, no longer uses the voluntary social
companion language.22 The Code should follow suit.
C. Male Perpetrator, Female Victim
The Code's gender specific requirement for rape is also problematic. The
Commentaries conceded, however, that a gender neutral approach "may well be...
more desirable. 23 For example, "[c]oerced vaginal intercourse by a female upon a
male is not explicitly covered by any of the [sexual offense] provisions. 24 Likewise,
the Commentaries state forthrightly that "[i]f the Model Code were being redrafted
today, it might well be that preserving these [gender] differences would not be thought
to outweigh the advantages of describing the entire offense of rape in gender-neutral
18 Id. cmt. 2 at 280.
19 Id.
20 Todd Spangler, Senator Takes Aim at Out-of-Date Rape Statute Still on the Books, DAILY
RECORD (Baltimore, MD), Sept. 24, 1997, at 24.
21 Id.
22 Stevens v. Delaware, 295 F.3d 361, 365 n.2 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 773
(2001)).
23 MODEL PENAL CODE 1980, supra note 2, § 213.1 cmt. 3 at 294.
24 Id. cmt. 6 at 336.
210 [Vol 1:207
MODEL PENAL CODE SEXUAL OFFENSE PROVISIONS
terms. 25 Gender neutrality could also "help to abrogate certain sex stereotypes that
our society is appropriately beginning to address. '26 On other pages, however, the
Commentaries oddly appear to waver on this issue; instead, they emphasize the
limited number of same-sexed cases that arise and the need to confine punishment for
first degree felonies to those cases "where the harm to the victim is, likely to be
perceived as the most severe." 27
Today, nearly all rape statutes in this country are gender neutral. 28 The male-
perpetrator, female-victim requirement dates the Code in light of modem attitudes and
knowledge about the comparable severity of rape involving other gender
combinations. 29 Given the Commentaries' own recognition of this inequity, a change
to gender neutrality is long overdue.
IV. THE CODE'S LITERATURE ON SEX AND RAPE
In general, the Commentaries highlighted the most progressive views on the
topics of sexuality and rape that reigned in the sixties and seventies (and that remain
important today). They also referred to scholarship that is still commonly cited, such
as Vivian Berger's landmark article in Columbia Law Review.30 Otherwise, however,
there was very little material available for them to use. For example, nearly all of the
Commentaries' references to trends in rape statutes rely on Helene Shapo's 1975
student Note in Virginia Law Review. 31 While Shapo's Note is well done, it appears
to be the only existing source for such information at the time, and the Commentaries,
by necessity, cite to it repeatedly.
I believe the Code's reporters wrote a highly informative and sophisticated text
given the cultural and societal constraints of the time. It would be unfair to judge
them in hindsight by today's standards, particularly because their efforts to be forward
thinking were so clear.32 Regardless, one of the more striking indicators of the dated
25 Id. at 337.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 338.
28 Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 315, 341
n.152.
29 DeborahW. Denno, Why Rape is Different, 63 FORDHAML. REV. 125, 127-28 (1994) (discussing
the severity of sexual assaults against males, which appear to be downplayed in the literature on rape).
30 Vivian Berger, Man 's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 COLUM. L.
REv. 1 (1977).
31 MODEL PENAL CODE 1980, supra note 2, § 213.1 cmt. 1 at 278-79 nn.16 & 24; cmt. 3 at 286
n.42; cmt. 3 at 299 n.60; cmt. 4 at 305 nn.87 & 90; cmt. 6 at 334 n. 168; cmt. 6 at 349-50 nn.208 & 211; §
213.6 cmt. 6 at 422 n.33; cmt. 6 at 425 n.51 (citing H. S. Shapo, Note, Recent Statutory Developments in
the Definition of Forcible Rape, 61 VA. L. REv. 1500 (1975)).
32 For a superb overview of the literature and thinking of the 1960s and 1970s, see generally
ALLYN, supra note 3. For example, Allyn notes in particular that the American Law Institute started
endorsing abortion reform in 1959 whereas the American Medical Association "objected to even limited
reform efforts until 1967." Id. at 178. Indeed, renowned figures at the time considered the American
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nature of the Commentaries are the books and articles that they reference; while
cutting edge and respected then, they now look, with rare exception, merely old
fashioned.
For the most part, these decades-old materials are referenced in the
Commentaries dealing with "deviate sexual intercourse by force or imposition..
'3
There seems to be a clear agenda prompting the use of this particular literature
because much of it discussed the prevalence and social acceptance of oral and anal sex
and therefore favored the decriminalization of homosexuality. The literature also
focused on feminist views of women's status and sexuality. Sources supporting the
rights of either women or homosexuals (or both) included Ms. Magazine,34 Sexology
Magazine35 (once a highly respected journal authored by renowned medical
practitioners but defunct since the 1970s), Rolling Stone,36 Parents' Magazine,37 and
Playboy38 (now often mocked, but at one time the source of insightful interviews with
prominent officials, such as former President Jimmy Carter).39
The Commentaries also cited, with varying levels of frequency, a series of then
popular and influential books: Against Our Will (1975), 4° The Female Eunuch
(1971), 4 1 Sexual Politics (1970),42 Sexual Behavior in the Human Female (1953), 43
Sexual Behavior in the Human Male (1st ed. 1948), 44 The Joy of Sex (1972), 45
Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Sex (1970),46 Sexual Harmony in
Law Institute's endorsement of abortion "the first major stimulus toward significant liberalization" of the
practice. DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE
V. WADE 277 (1994).
33 MODEL PENAL CODE 1980, supra note 2, § 213.2.
34 Id. § 213.1 cmt. 3 at 281 n.25.
31 Id. at 283 n.32.
36 Id. cmt. 6 at 349 n.208.
37 Id. § 213.2 cmt. 2 at 363 n.26.
38 Id.; 366 n.31.
39 See ALLYN, supra note 3, at 27 (noting that Hugh Hefner, the founder of Playboy, "included
enough serious material-short stories, interviews, investigative journalism, and cultural criticism by
popular writers-to make his magazine respectable in the eyes of most middle-class Americans").
40 MODEL PENAL CODE 1980, supra note 2, § 213.1 cmt. 3 at 281 n.27 (citing SUSAN BROWNMILLER,
AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE (1975)) (cited throughout the Commentaries).
41 Id. at 283 n.32 (citing GERMAINE GREER, THE FEMALE EUNUCH (1971)).
42 Id. at 350 cmt 6 n.211 (citing KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS (1970)); § 213.6 cmt. 6 at 427
n.60 (same).
43 Id. § 213.2 cmt. 1 at 358 n.2 (citing ALFRED C. KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN
FEMALE (1953)); 359 n.6 (same); § 213.6 note 3 at 437 n.26 (same).
44 Id. § 213.2 cmt. 2 at363 n.27 (citing ALFRED C. KINSEYETAL., SEXUALBEHAVIORINTHEHUMAN
MALE (1948)); § 213.6 note 3 at 437 nn.26 & 27 (same).
45 Id. § 213.2 cmt. 2 at 363 n.26 (citing ALEX COMFORT, THE JOY OF SEX: A CORDON BLEU GUIDE
TO LOVEMAKING (1972)).
46 Id. (citing DAVID R. REUBEN, EVERYTHING YOU ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT SEX, BUT
WERE AFRAID TO ASK (1970)).
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Marriage (1955),47 and-The Pleasure Bond (1970).48 This groundbreaking literature is
now, for the most part,49 the stuff of history. In some cases, it is also empirically
questionable, such as Kinsey's research, which had a particularly strong impact on the
Code's reporters.5 0 One can imagine future generations of law professors and students
who simply will not be able to recognize these book titles or relate to their contents,
despite the worthy rationales for their use.
Other books, such as Meniachem Amir's Patterns in Forcible Rape,51 are cited
throughout the Commentaries as a reliable source of rape statistics. Yet, Amir's data
are over four decades old. Some findings have not stood the test of time-for
example, Amir's conclusion that nineteen percent of all rapes were "victim-
precipitated" based upon a very broad, and unprecedented, definition of what
"precipitation" means.52 There are numerous, more methodologically sound studies
that can now replace these data for authority.
V. SOME OF THE CODE'S FEATURES THAT FAIL THE TEST OF TIME
Additional, perhaps more widely discussed, aspects of the Code's sexual offense
provisions also show their age. Some of these aspects are listed below.
A. The Marital Immunity Rule
The marital immunity rule-specifying that a husband could not legally rape his
wife-has been narrowed or abolished in nearly all states. The Code, however,
adopted a partial marital exemption; generally, nonconsensual intercourse with a
spouse is not rape.53 But, the Commentaries recognized that the times were changing
and that the Code could too:
41 Id. at n.28. (citing OLIVER M. BUTTERFIELD, SEXUAL HARMONY IN MARRIAGE (1953)).
48 Id. (citing WILLIAM H. MASTERS ET AL., THE PLEASURE BOND: A NEW LOOK AT SEXUALITY AND
COMMITMENT (1970)).
49 Of course, these comments are not to suggest that this literature is unworthy or unimportant.
Rather, the literature is historical and not necessarily representative of current attitudes.
50 See Allyn, supra note 9, at 407-28.
51 MENACHEM AMIR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE (1971).
52 Id. at 266. Amir's definition of "victim precipitation" would not be found acceptable today.
The term "victim precipitation" describes those rape situations in which the
victim actually, or so it was deemed, agreed to sexual relations but retracted
before the actual act or did not react strongly enough when the suggestion was
made by the offender(s). The term applies also to cases in risky situations
marred with sexuality, especially when she [the victim] uses what could be
interpreted as indecency of language and gestures, or constitutes what could be
taken as an invitation to sexual relations.
Id.
53 MODEL PENAL CODE 1980, supra note 2, § 213.6(2) at 411.
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Extension of criminal sanctions to reach coercive relations between
husband and wife is a common feature of feminist proposals for
reforming the law of rape, and appears to have been accepted in a
number of recent revisions. This activity should prompt a fresh
look at the advisability of the spousal exclusion.
5 4
B. The Corroboration Requirement
The corroboration requirement-mandating that no person will be convicted of
rape upon the uncorroborated testimony of the alleged victim 55-has been heavily
criticized and is now followed by only a few states.56 Yet, the Code still retains the
requirement. Most likely, the Code's reporters thought that it would have been
difficult to eliminate such a rule in 1962 since it was then followed by the majority of
states.57 Regardless, the Commentaries acknowledged the controversy surrounding
the rule in the 1970s and stressed that attitudes toward the doctrine were increasingly
in a state of flux.
5 8
C. The Prompt Complaint Rule
Under the Code's prompt complaint rule, a prosecution for a sexual offense is
barred if a competent adult complainant fails to notify a law enforcement agency of
the offense within three months of its occurrence. 59 By today's standards, this
requirement is highly dubious and the Code's reasons for it are troubling. The Code's
rule--"an innovation in Anglo-American law" 60--is also one of the rare times the
Code made a conservative deviation from legal trends. For example, the
Commentaries acknowledged that "[a]t the time the Model Penal Code was drafted,
failure to make a prompt complaint did not bar prosecution for a sex offense in any
jurisdiction, but evidence of prompt notification to the authorities was admissible to
rebut a suggestion of fabrication by the complainant.'
The Commentaries' reasons for the prompt complaint rule hark back to a time
when there was a strong presumption that a substantial number of female
complainants would invent their charges for a wide range of reasons: "unwanted
pregnancy," "bitterness at a relationship gone sour [that] might convert a willing
participant in sexual relations into a vindictive complainant," or "the opportunity for
54 Id. § 213.1 cmt. 6 at 343.
55 MODEL PENAL CODE 1980, supra note 2, § 213.6(5) at 412.
56 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 598 (3d ed. 2001).
57 MODEL PENAL CODE 1980, supra note 2, § 213.6 cmt. 6 at 423.
58 Id. at 422 (recognizing that "[s]pecial rules of this sort have excited considerable controversy in
recent years and have become targets of bitter criticism by feminist reformers and their allies").
59 MODEL PENAL CODE 1980, supra note 2, § 213.6(4) at 412.
60 Id. cmt. 5 at 421.
61 Id. at 420.
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blackmailing another by threatening to bring a criminal charge of sexual
aggression"-an "objective" that the Commentaries considered to be "especially
critical for those offenses involving consensual relations., 62 For example, "[t]he
parents of an underage girl who has engaged in intercourse with an older male...
may forego public prosecution, which does nothing to enhance the reputation of their
daughter, in favor of private gain., 63 As the Commentaries explained, "[r]equiring
complaint within three months of learning of such an event reduces the ability of such
persons to demand continuing payment for silence." 64
The Commentaries provide no support whatsoever for any of these presumptions
or speculations. By today's standards, they sound outrageous. Yet, such views were
entirely consistent with American norms and culture at the time they were expressed.
While the strong social presumption of female "sexual blackmail" took full force in
65the beginning decades of the twentieth century, it was still widely accepted when the
Code's provisions and Commentaries were being drafted.
D. The Sexually Promiscuous Complainant Rule
Under some subsections of the "corruption of minors and sexual assault"
provisions, the Code provides a defense "that the alleged victim had, prior to the time
of the offense charged, engaged promiscuously in sexual relations with others., 66 The
Commentaries explain that "proof of prior sexual promiscuity rebuts the presumption
of naivet& and inexperience that supports the imposition of criminal liability., 67 A
primary example is "the underage prostitute" for whom "imposition of felony
sanctions designed to protect the young and inexperienced seems manifestly
inappropriate., 68 The Commentaries conceded, however, that "[m]ost of the recently
drafted codes and proposals have not included a similar defense. '69
While the Code was consistent with the social times, the Commentaries
acknowledged that the sexually promiscuous complainant rule was not up with the
legal times. The rule certainly contravenes what we know now.
62 Id. at 421.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 For an excellent overview of these developments, see generally ANGUS MCLAREN, SEXUAL
BLACKMAIL: A MODERN HISTORY (2002).
66 MODEL PENAL CODE 1980, supra note 2, § 213.6(3) at 412. The Commentaries point out that
this provision does not apply to the MPC "offenses defined in terms of force or imposition." Id. § 213.6
cmt. 4 at 419.
67 Id. § 213.6 cmt. 4 at 420.
68 id.
69 Id.
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E. Types of Sexual Activity and Influences on Rape
The Code's sexual offense provisions inherited their era. For example, the
sexual abuse of young children was not nearly as widely recognized as it is today, 
70
marital and nonmarital sexual relationships were far more sexually conservative the
concept of "date rape" was just starting to be introduced, HIV/AIDS was not an issue,
casual Interet meetings among people did not exist, and the use of date rape drugs
was rare and less serious. Likewise, there was far less awareness of more diverse
forms of sexual activity, such as sadomasochistic sex, or other means of penetration
which the Code was just beginning to acknowledge, for example, "digital or
mechanical penetration.",71 A modem rape statute would at least address these kinds
of issues, as well as recent developments such as whether or not'a state should
recognize post-penetrative rape.72
F. Psychological and Cultural Attitudes Toward Sex
The Code's provisions were influenced by the psychoanalytic age of their
origins-the 1950s and 1960s 73-while the Commentaries also reflected the cultural
landscape of the 1960s and 1970s. Morris Ploscowe, one of the Code's most
renowned reporters, became a symbol of some of the more sexist attitudes spanning
these decades by virtue of his writings and proclamations. Although Ploscowe
asserted a number of inflammatory remarks, perhaps his most remembered are those
pertaining to the reasons for having a corroboration requirement for rape (as opposed
to other crimes). According to Ploscowe, corroboration was important because when
it comes to rape, "ladies lie."74 Ploscowe never successfully shed the repercussions of
making this statement, which was even highlighted in his New York Times obituary.
75
70 For example, there is only one footnote on the subject of sexual abuse of young children in the
Commentaries and that footnote cites only to two books that are each a half-century old. Id. § 213.1 cmt.
6 at 328 n. 149 (citing BENJAMIN KARPMAN, THE SEXUAL OFFENDER AND HIS OFFENSES (1954); MoRRIs
PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW (1951)).
71 Id. cmt. 8 at 346.
72 See In re John Z, 60 P.3d 183, 184 (Cal. 2003) (holding that a "withdrawal of consent [during
intercourse] effectively nullifies any earlier consent and subjects the male to forcible rape charges if he
persists in what has become nonconsensual intercourse").
73 Deborah W. Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science andInvoluntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV.
269, 294-308,(2002).
74 William M. Freeman, Ex-MagistratePloscoweDies; Criminal-Law Expert Was 71, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 1975, at 36. There was a great outcry to Ploscowe's statement. See, e.g., Lesley Oelsner,
"Because Ladies Lie, " N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 1972, at E5 (noting that "there appears to be a lot of
opinion-filled literature, but little statistical fact" supporting the proposition that people lie more about
rape than other crimes, such as robbery).
75 Freeman, supra note 74, at 36. Morris Ploscowe's quarter-page obituary contained the
following:
In 1972, discussing legislation on rape, [Ploscowe] observed that the victim's
word was sufficient for a prosecutor to make out a prima facie case, enough to
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G. Psychological and Cultural Attitudes Toward Sexual Assault
The language the Commentaries use is often noticeably antiquated even when the
Code's recommendations seem sensible. A particularly startling illustration is the
Commentaries' attempt to distinguish sexual assault, 76 an "invasion of personal
dignity," from legally acceptable personal contact, such as a "casual expression of
affection or approval. 77 According to the Commentaries, "[t]he basketball coach
who pats his players on the bottom is merely fulfilling a ritual of congratulation. Even
if such contact proves unwelcome to the recipient, the actor may not be held liable for
this offense., 78 But when the Commentaries go further and attempt to differentiate
acceptable from unacceptable uses of tactile contact, they rely on an archaic
hypothetical involving an "affectionate" elderly man and a young woman. The
Commentaries have this to say:
Premising liability on a kiss or hug would place too much weight
on the ability of the judge or jury to distinguish affection from
passion.79 The elderly gentleman who kisses a pretty girl or pats
her on the bottom should not be subjected to prosecution as a sex
offender on the theory that he was securing sexual gratification by
such conduct .... This provision therefore requires some more
demonstrative act .... 80
This example illuminates how the language of the Commentaries is tainted by the
time in which they were written. These colloquial remarks, which were perhaps
customary decades ago, seem entirely inappropriate to us now. They also show that
the criminal law must move forward.
VI. CONCLUSION
This essay examined the Model Penal Code's sexual offense provisions and
Commentaries to support my recommendation that the Code's sexual offense
provisions be pulled and replaced. Of course, in such limited space, my purpose was
not to propose how this should be done but simply why. The best argument for
change comes from simply considering what the Code's provisions, and their
Commentaries, say.
take to a jury on assault, robbery, fraud and other crimes, but it was not enough
for the crime of rape, because, he said, "ladies lie."
Id.
76 MODEL PENAL CODE 1980, supra note 2, § 213.4 at 397.
77 Id. cmt. 2 at401.
78 id.
79 Id. at 401 n. 11 (citations omitted).
80 Id.
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Some may think that, with the diversity of today's culture, it may be too difficult
to reach a consensus on new model sexual offense provisions. I do not think that's the
case, given the controversies that existed when the initial provisions were created.
The Code's reporters have already addressed some of the most arduous questions.
They have also established a firm foundation of principles so reforms can remain
"real ' 81 and not radical.82 This is not to suggest that the task of revising the Code's
sexual offense provisions will be easy. I'm sure the first set of reporters encountered
enormous hurdles. Yet, those reporters serve as an inspiration for us all. Hard jobs
can get done.
81 See Lynch, supra note 1, at 236-39.
82 For a pointed discussion about the problems stemming from the somewhat more radical changes
from rape law precedent, see Joshua Dressier, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might be Going.
Some Cautionary Reflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 409 (1998).
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